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Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake‟s book, Cyber War, claims to identify a new 
threat and vulnerability in the United States. By examining the points they make and 
evaluating them in the context of the first cyber attack, STUXNET, we shall conclude that 
the technical argument is correct; however the overall argument is incomplete. What 
they fail to emphasize is the amount of human intelligence involved in committing a 
successful cyber attack, and the extent to which having intelligence operations greatly 
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 Richard A. Clarke became a household name in the aftermath of September 11th 
2001, when it was revealed that his warnings about an Al-Qaeda attack of such a scale 
had gone unheeded across two Presidential administrations, and that he himself was 
marginalized in the twilight years of his civil service. Upon completing his 30 years in the 
government, he graduated in typical fashion into private consulting. In early 2010, 
Harper Collins published his highly anticipated book, which was coauthored by Robert K. 
Knake, that documents a new warning: Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security 
and What to do About It. 
 First, a definition and a short summary: as Clarke and Knake describe on page 3, 
“when the term „cyber war‟ is used in this book, it refers to actions by a nation-state to 
penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage 
or disruption.” Clarke and Knake are not talking about mere espionage, but counterforce 
and countervalue. In summary the authors are making these three points: 1) that cyber 
warfare is possible and upon us, 2) that the United States is particularly susceptible to 
cyber attack, and 3) that there are steps it could take to mitigate its susceptibility to cyber 
attacks.  
 With the benefit of a few months and a few real world incidents, a clearer picture 
of the reality of cyber warfare has emerged. And with this, a better means to gauge the 






commonly viewed as the first wave of cyber attack, could be considered much needed 
proof that the book could otherwise not provide. However, more than this one example is 
needed to verify the conclusions of their book; specifically that Clarke‟s prescriptions are 
the correct ones to take. 
 This paper will go beyond the initial evaluations by critics and supporters, and 
consider whether Clarke‟s fore-warnings and conclusions make internal and technical 
sense. We will discover that while Clarke is actually technically right regarding the 
vulnerabilities he identifies, his analysis is incomplete. What he misses is the fact that 
states have other assets, intelligence operations that enhance their ability to conduct 
cyber attacks, which bypass many of the technical vulnerabilities which are highlighted. 











 Clarke‟s introduction to the problem of cyber warfare is a sneaky one. The book 
opens with a rather colorful anecdote from 2007 about Israeli fighter-bombers destroying 
a Syrian nuclear reactor site in a daring midnight raid. But beneath this depiction he pulls 
at an unnoticed thread, at how these stealthless fourth-generation aircraft overcame a 
sophisticated air defense system designed precisely to counter this type of attack. The 
Israeli Air Force had hacked the Syrian defense networks and had co-opted the radar 
system to read clear skies. In this way, Clarke introduces cyber warfare as the shadowy 
counterpart to direct military action. He tries to inform his reader of the threat posed by 
something that is essentially invisible, by pushing it into the light of an exploding nuclear 
reactor. 
 Yet within a matter of pages he commits a glaring technical blunder: he conflates 
radar signal with data packets. There is no mistaking author's intention, as the writing is 
very specific in the text of the error on page 7: 
A stealthy Israeli UAV might... have been able to detect the radar beam coming 
up from the ground toward it and used that very same radio frequency to transmit 
computer packets back down into the radar's computer and from there into the 
Syrian air defense network. [Emphasis added] 
If we take the authors‟ claims seriously, then we would be led to believe that Syrian 






their communications network, in the exact same waveform as a typical data packet of 
headers and information. Further, a careful reader might have noticed this preceding 
passage on page 6: “Radar still works essentially the same way it began seventy years 
ago at the Battle of Britain. A radar sends out a directional radio beam. If the beam hits 
anything, it bounces back to a receiver.” Thus at least one of the authors has some idea 
about how radar works. Perhaps Clarke really meant to say that the stealth UAV flew in 
to discover the defense communications frequencies, gather some wireless traffic, send 
that home, and have machines break the encryption, all done days in advance. Or 
perhaps they simply jammed the radar site, or otherwise spoofed the radar using 
software similar to Suter (a BAE software package designed specifically to defeat air 
defenses). Regardless, the language very clearly communicates a technical error to the 
reader very early on in Cyber War. 
 This point is completely missed in all the reviews of his book, some of which are 
very skeptical and others outright critical of Clarke's message. How is it that these 
reviews, which claim to identify Clarke's misunderstandings on technical matters, neglect 
to point out a technical blunder that is so easily noticed on page 7 of the book? Did they 
even read the book, and what is the critique that they present? I‟ll provide three 
representative examples: 
 First, Michiko Kakutani (2010) from The New York Times makes little attempt to 
evaluate statements made in the book, instead relying on Clarke's credentials as the 
misunderstood counter-terrorism chief to two Presidential administrations, and his 
“insider‟s knowledge” as reason enough to accept the portents and solutions presented 
in Cyber War. Second, Misha Glenny (2010) from the Financial Times attempts to write 






quick read and word count will betray a not-so-subtle critique of academics, civil 
servants and security professionals seeking federal funding, and an emergent 
“cybersecurocracy” securing little beyond government bloat. Third, Evgeny Morozov, a 
contributor to The Wall Street Journal and Foreign Policy, has been openly critical, 
although he hasn't directly reviewed the book. He writes: “Wired says Richard Clarke‟s 
Cyberwar should be filed under fiction. I say science fiction,” and “given that Clarke runs 
a cybersecurity consulting firm, what else would he say? That America's cyber-defenses 
are secure?” (I will discuss the Wired review shortly.) There are others, including ones in 
The Wall Street Journal (Reynolds, 2010) and The Washington Post (Stein, 2010), which 
fall into one of these general categories. 
 Essentially these are ad hominem attacks on the authors, rather than evaluations 
of their argument. While they claim to point to Clarke's failings in technical sophistication 
(and the authors admittedly chose to write for a non-technical audience), they 
aggressively paint Clarke as an opportunist seizing upon his new-found fame as a 
prophet of national security. In other words, he is a super-mutant variety of the 
government employee cashing out as a private contractor, writ large. On the other hand, 
the piece in The New York Times doesn't properly address the book's content either, 
relying on the reputation of the author as sufficient, thereby merely accepting an 
argument from authority. Neither approach addresses the authors‟ argument directly.  
 The merit of evidence is measured by the credibility of its source, while merit of 
an argument is measured by the quality of its logic and assumptions. For example in The 
Wall Street Journal, Evgeny Morozov rightly dismisses the “simulation” concocted by 
industry insiders and broadcast on CNN (16 February 2010) dubbed “Cyber 






American vulnerability to cyber attack, performed by security and policy firms, cannot be 
considered credible evidence of an actual vulnerability. However, Clarke‟s Cyber War is 
simultaneously a testimony and an argument: he recounts his own experiences in 
government on national cyber-security issues, but he also assembles an argument about 
this next-generation threat. This argument deserves a fair evaluation.  
 The most provocative and promising critique of Clarke‟s book comes from 
Wired‟s review “File under Fiction” by Ryan Singel (2010). He first states that much of 
the book could “easily debunked with a Google search, or so defies common sense.” 
And he justifiably complains that the author provides absolutely no footnotes, endnotes 
or bibliographical entries, sardonically adding “Revelation doesn't need sources.” 
Apparently neither does the contentious book review. While the article poses actual 
direct counters to the book‟s main points, there are no notes or hyperlinks to sources in 
his refutations; it‟s his word against Clarke‟s. What exactly we are meant to debunk via 
Google search and what we are meant to assume as nonsensical is left unexplained. He 
rounds the review by repeatedly poking fun at Clarke‟s allusions to Hollywood movies 
and ridiculing the silliest examples from the book (throwaway examples such as 
photocopiers exploding) as examples of the fantasy engendered by Cyber War. 
 However, this does point to several poor choices in the book‟s writing. In addition 
to lacking notes and references to sources, there are various points where he could 
have anchored his points with straightforward summaries or conclusions, but instead 
chooses parochial punchlines to conclude otherwise serious points. At one point he even 
preempts criticism by stating “quibblers will argue with the overly simplistic methodology” 
when presenting a chart filled with numbers representing “cyber war strength” on page 






own estimates; in which case a scale like “high,” “medium,” and “low” should have 
sufficed. Still worse, he concludes from the numerical chart that “the results are 
revelatory.” Thus he declares revelation from numbers he had literally made up!) While 
this is more an issue of style, it is in the book and it does detract from the reading.  
 In the end, Clarke and Knake are making serious claims. Except they do so in a 
book appealing to a wide audience, rather than technical experts. They intend to 
motivate a non-expert public into being concerned with a technical problem that is 
impossible to visualize, doing their best with analogs and description (see Appendix I: 
The Political Context). And this rhetorical strategy can be easily dismissed as fear-
mongering, especially coming from an individual who had just made the jump into the 
private security consulting. Eisenhower's old warning about the military-industrial 
complex echo loudly while reading. However, the claims are broad, and if true, the 











 As stated in the introduction, the book can roughly be broken down into three 
points: 1) that cyber warfare is possible and upon us, 2) that the United States is 
particularly susceptible to cyber attack, and that 3) there are steps it could take to 
mitigate its susceptibility to cyber attacks. Clarke and Knake's Cyber War consists of 
eight chapters: Chapters Three, Five and Eight make up the bulk of the technical 
argument and solution.  
 Chapters One and Two introduce the topic, provide definitions and go over who‟s 
doing what in cyberspace, specifically the US, North Korea, China and Russia. 
 Chapter Three begins the heart of their argument, where the authors go over the 
technology and its vulnerabilities: 1) the structure of the Internet backbone, its openness 
and commercial penetration; 2) the routine bugginess of both software, which is growing 
increasingly complex with line-counts in the millions, and hardware, which is 
predominantly manufactured overseas; and most importantly 3) SCADA systems. 
Defined on page 98 as “Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition” systems, SCADA 
systems are the means by which real-world systems such as transit controls, utility 
pipelines, and electricity are monitored and routed, remotely via computer controls. (An 
example is the Siemens industrial control software targeted by STUXNET.) These points 






 Chapter Four reviews Clarke‟s allegations of neglect by Presidents Clinton, Bush 
and Obama. Each time Clarke was greeted with warm enthusiasm and initial readiness 
to engage, but he found that the various Presidents would in-turn defer to large political 
donors. Further, the chapter explains that the NSA and Department of Defense are 
responsible for defense networks and offensive capabilities, Department of Homeland 
Security covers government networks in general, but no government entity has 
responsibility for the private Internet. 
 Chapter Five returns to the argument, and suggests a three pronged strategy to 
handle the cyber-vulnerability of the American public. First, the Internet backbone should 
scan traffic for malware signatures; second, America should black-box or air-gap the 
power-grid specifically; and third, America should enhance the security of its classified 
military networks.  
 Chapters Six and Seven branch out to broadly cover classic political science 
concerns: escalation, retaliation and military strategy, diplomacy and geopolitics, and 
then a follow-on chapter on arms control and use limitations. Given the lack of 
agreement on the exact effects of cyber warfare, these points appear premature and 
underdeveloped. 
 Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the book, summarizes the broad points and 
provides a six-point agenda that should guide American thinking about cyber-warfare for 
the long term. From the points scattered across these chapters, the following premises 
can be constructed: 
1) States are willing to exploit cyberspace. They are interested in attacking 
SCADA and other systems and have done so, and since the Internet is wide 






Director of National Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell: “The vast majority of 
industrialized countries in the world today have cyber-attack capabilities” (p.64). 
(A side note: they state that Cyber-terrorism is a red herring, as terrorist groups 
are using the Internet mainly for communications, not attack.) 
2) The Internet backbone is unmonitored. Anything can get anywhere by design. 
The architecture of TCP/IP involves only scanning packet headers for destination 
information, and thus the gateways and routers blindly forward any traffic as 
requested: “While the protocols that were developed based on these rules 
allowed for the massive growth in networking and the creation of the Internet as 
we know it today, they also sowed the seeds for the security problems” (p.83). 
3) SCADA systems, for power, other utilities and transit, are not secured. 
Attempts to isolate them using virtual private networking and firewalls are 
imperfect. Most worrisome is that an attack on power is also a simultaneous 
attack on all the others, including finance, government and military systems, as 
backup systems are temperamental and unreliable: “These control programs... 
regulate the electric load in various locations. The signals are most often sent via 
internal computer network... Unfortunately, many of the devices also have other 
connections. One survey found that a fifth of the devices on the electric grid had 
wireless or radio access... and almost half had direct connections to the Internet” 
(p.98-99). 
4) While USCYBERCOM/NSA has the military covered, Dept. of Homeland 
Security has the civilian government covered, no one has the U.S. private sector 
Internet covered: “U.S. Cyber Command also has a defensive mission... the 






federal agency that has the mission to defend the banking system, the 
transportation networks, or the power grid” (p.143). Further, civilian Internet 
security isn‟t even regulated: “the Federal Communications Commission has the 
legal power to regulate but it largely chosen [sic] not to do that” (p.146).  
5) The United States is more dependent on the Internet than its closest global 
competitors, particularly in having its infrastructure reliant on networked computer 
controllers: according to Clarke‟s testimony, the US is the most “reliant upon 
networks and systems that could be vulnerable to attack” (p.148). 
6) Even without immediate access, a state could implant logic bombs to destroy 
precious data or pre-position backdoors to exploit at sensitive times: “The phrase 
„preparation of the battlefield‟ has become somewhat elastic. The battle does not 
need to be imminent, and almost anyplace can be a battlefield someday...” 
“[Installing trapdoor or logic bomb] does not mean that you have already decided 
to conduct that war, but it certainly means that you want to be ready to do so” 
(p.198-199). 
7) Finance is vulnerable, and while it should be secured, it is slightly less of a 
concern (as compared to SCADA systems) because states‟ financial systems are 
interdependent and governments don't wish to see banking institutions involved 
in fighting: “Every major nation has a stake in the reliability of the data that 
underpin  international bank clearing houses... a cyber attack on one nation's 
financial infrastructure could have a fast moving ripple effect, undermining 






In short, the U.S. is most highly wired and networked, with critical systems vulnerable 
due to their inadvertent accessibility via the Internet, threatened by capable states that 
indeed have plans to exploit such vulnerability for political reasons.  
 From these premises he concludes 1) cyber war is possible and can generate 
real world effects 2) that the United States is ultimately the most vulnerable power in 
cyberspace, 3) since reacting to an attack is essentially impossible, we can best 
overcome these problems by prevention and preparation. Of course there's far more 
going on in the book: Clarke's experiences in government, detailed histories of the 
various efforts being made by each nation, and more. However these other points rely 
on this central piece working correctly. These premises and conclusions lead them to 
propose three solutions in Chapter Five: 
1) Have the major tier 1 ISPs scan the Internet backbone for digital signatures of 
an attack using existing technology: “If you could catch the attack entering the 
backbone, you could stop it before it got to the network it was going to attack. If 
you did that, you would not have to worry as much about hardening tens of 
thousands of potential targets for cyber attack” (p.161).  
2) Secure, or air-gap the power-grid: “Without electricity, most other things we 
rely on do not work, or at least not for long. The easiest thing a nation state cyber 
attacker could do today to have a major impact on the U.S. would be to shut 
down sections of the Eastern or Western Interconnects, the two big grids that 
cover the U.S. and Canada” (p.167). 
3) Secure the nation's defense networks, NIPRNet (unclassified), SIPRNet 
(secret), and JWICS (top secret): “if an opponent were going to hit us with a large 






cyber attack on the U.S. military would likely concentrate on DoD's networks” 
(p.171). 
 Further, there is his six point agenda in Chapter Eight: 1) enhanced dialogue 
about cyber war, 2) better regulation to accomplish the above three solutions from 
Chapter Five, 3) reduce cyber crime, 4) international limits on cyber war, 5) better 
software, 6) the President should be in more involved. 
 The next three sections will evaluate the argument and the solutions presented in 
Cyber War. First, we‟ll assess at how accurate they are about the technical threat. 
Second, we‟ll discuss what they should have discussed in greater depth: the human 
factor and human intelligence in cyber warfare. Third, we‟ll present a critique of the 









From Bugs to Armageddon 
 
 In the 1990s, a considerable fuss was made regarding the turnover to the year 
2000. Dubbed the Y2K bug, the concern was that the underlying code upon which 
banking software, air traffic control systems, and utility management software were built, 
would crash once computer clocks went from 12/31/99 to 01/01/00. This was a memory 
saving shortcut from the kilobyte era that was written into software that nobody believed 
would still be in use 30 years later (and the next time this problem will occur is in 2038 
with the UNIX clock bug). When civilization didn‟t collapse on January 1, and the 
machines upon which we depend continued to function, the question was raised whether 
it was all the preparation and prevention that mitigated the effects, or whether the 
original threat was overblown. There are some parallels between Y2K and cyber 
warfare. 
 The Internet grew out of what was essentially a science experiment. The original 
creators could not have envisioned their project being used in such a fashion, pushing 
such massive volumes of data across the globe, with energy networks, financial services 
and other utilities wholly dependent on it (when a corporate network goes down due to a 
worm attack, it is an automatic work-stoppage). One example of the Internet as an 
experiment colliding with its unintended usage is the IPv4 address exhaustion. As the 
Internet expands, and connected devices proliferate, IP addresses are assigned to each 






little experiment, 32-bit addressing would suffice (4.3 billion unique IP numbers). Yet 
decades later these address numbers are rapidly running out, and moving to the new 
standard, with 128-bit addresses, has caused a small stir with implementation. Every few 
weeks there is a new story about this migration, specifically with regards to legacy 
networks, updating ISP routers, and OS tunneling between IPv4 and IPv6.  
 Here is Clarke‟s opening salvo in Cyber War. He warns that no less than national 
security is at stake, based upon the combination of the Internet‟s inherent openness and 
bugs in the end-users‟ software. Like Y2K, the Internet‟s myopic design of convenience 
has essentially become a bug that, as Clarke would argue, has potentially catastrophic 
consequences. He identifies five weaknesses in the design of this once experimental 
Internet: 1) the addressing system (the Domain Name System servers), 2) the routing 
system (the Border Gateway Protocol system), 3) the fact that the vast majority of traffic 
is unencrypted, 4) the existence of malware, and the 5) decentralized design (p.74-82).  
 What we must evaluate is how right Clarke is on these fronts. Regarding the 
DNS servers, DNS poisoning is a well known attack vector: Clarke provides not only how 
this is accomplished, he explains its origins also: the security specialist Dan Kaminsky 
(p.77). This is also a relatively recent discovery (2008) of a latent bug that has existed 
since the birth of the Internet.  
 Likewise with the BGP: researchers have handily shown that this is a possibility. 
Here, adversaries can not only surreptitiously read the traffic, collect it to analyze later, 
and forward it to its final destination, they can also modify its contents if they had the 
wherewithal to do so (Zetter 2008). Again, this is an architectural vulnerability that has 






 However it has always been known that the vast majority of internet traffic is 
unencrypted, and that this poses a severe problem. Running a packet sniffer will display 
the contents of most data transmissions over any unsecured wireless (e.g. one can use 
“ethereal,” renamed “wireshark” to do so). Secured wireless has also vulnerable: given 
time, a machine can collect packets in silent mode, and eventually crack the encryption 
key (e.g. using “airsnort,” renamed “aircrack”). WPA2 actually has an implementation 
error such that a man in the middle can read and manipulate traffic without even dealing 
with the AES encryption it employs (Wexler 2010). What‟s worse is that while many 
password pages do use end-to-end encryption (your email login page with the “https”), 
the identifying cookie is sent unencrypted. Listening in on the wireless traffic allows an 
attacker to easily swipe the cookie, and then pretend to be the user (this is in fact so 
easy, in early 2010 a concerned netizen, Eric Butler, wrote a plug-in for Firefox named 
“Firesheep,” which can do this automatically for any user, to illustrate why this is a major 
problem). Telnet, a popular connection protocol, does not even encrypt the password 
field, such that it can be clearly seen to any listener; Telnet was bundled with operating 
systems as recent as Windows XP.  
 Moreover, the computing solutions employed by end users of the Internet, home 
user operating systems, browsers, browser plug-ins, and middleware (ActiveX, Adobe 
Flash, Adobe AIR, Java, PDFs and Silverlight), are prone to vulnerabilities. Every few 
weeks, a new “zero-day” bug is discovered, requiring patching by Microsoft or Adobe on 
the next “patch Tuesday.” From default open ports in operating systems, the infamous 
Windows .dll bug, to the Linux kernel‟s root-user privilege bug in its 64-bit 
implementation (which went un-patched for years), the opportunity for malware exists on 






 His last point about the decentralized nature of the Internet isn‟t particularly 
remarkable, except to suggest that any attempts to effect change would involve 
coordination between a number of entities. He rightly points out that it was precisely this 
decentralized nature that spurred the explosive growth of the Internet, but there isn‟t 
much more here than there was in the first two points regarding the Internet‟s 
architecture. 
 Clarke‟s next major point about cyber warfare is where cyberspace meets the 
real world: government command and control and SCADA systems. This is the point 
where the Internet goes beyond espionage, and into the realms of counter-force and 
counter-value capabilities, or real cyber war.  
 First, Clarke points out how the U.S. government has transitioned from the 
leading edge of computing to the trailing edge. Before, the government had the premier 
computer scientists and programmers, and military computing operating systems were 
custom written for government purposes. Now, the vast majority of innovation on this 
front occurs privately, and for-profit. For example, when I worked for the Air Force 
Research Laboratory, I visited a start-up technology company in Boston prior to their 
IPO, and reviewed their technology and funding. When I asked about what their funding 
levels were and how much more they needed, I was rebuffed: any money I had to work 
with was dwarfed by what the mobile phone companies were already putting in. 
Furthermore, software programs that were vital for the war-fighters I was supporting, 
irreplaceable pieces of kit, were all written solely for the Windows operating system. I 
recall asking a communications officer, who was part of the team behind the “secured” 
Air Force specific version of Windows Vista, what we got for our money: he replied “too 






 More importantly, Clarke provides numerous examples of how private industrial 
SCADA systems are vulnerable (p.96-101). STUXNET puts this into stark relief, when 
previous occurrences hadn‟t convinced others, namely when U.S. power facilities were 
allegedly under threat (Gorman 2009). In particular, the SCADA system specifically 
targeted by STUXNET had faults shared by other industrial control systems. The 
Siemens control software packages (WinCC and PCS7) actually required that the 
passwords be kept to the default value for the control software to properly function. 
Further, as software packages built for Windows systems, they were subsequently 
susceptible to any number of zero-day vulnerabilities missed at Microsoft (Falliere et al 
2010). And, like all malware, only a small number of tweaks are necessary to target 
alternative SCADA packages (Clayton 2010). 
 In short, from a technical standpoint, Clarke had solidly identified areas where 
the Internet is vulnerable, relying on bugs which had previously been highlighted back in 
2008. And in areas where he might have speculated, reality very quickly confirmed the 
existence of the threat. Like Y2K, much of the Internet‟s vulnerability is an unintended 
consequence of a technology outlasting its breadboard origins, of an experiment turned 
into the basis for modern commerce and communications. Like Y2K, Clarke argues, 
preemptive measures and prevention are necessary to protect modern society. The 
bugs in the design are real, in each level that Clarke identifies. However, there‟s more to 









The Human Factor 
 
 Where Clarke missteps, and where the critics have a stronger case to make, is 
with regards to human agency in cyber warfare. Clarke was right when he made the 
point that states are interested in conducting cyber warfare. He is also correct in stating 
that cyber terrorism is not a major threat, as confirmed by other researchers (Cavelty 
2007, Conway 2007).  
 While he makes these points, he repeatedly slips into a mode of fear-mongering: 
he‟ll use the image of faraway hackers and their laptops hiding in a closet, bringing down 
U.S. systems, one after another, and obfuscating their attack paths through servers in 
third party countries (p.64-68, p.101). Here, the critics have the most leverage to poke 
holes in what Clarke is saying: his occasional slips into a simplified caricature of his own 
points stretch his credibility. Technically he makes sense at every level, from the 
Internet‟s open design, to software vulnerabilities, to SCADA under attack. However, his 
breakdown is incomplete: all the technical reasons together paint a picture of cyber 
warfare as a sterile attack that can be accomplished across continents by unseen forces. 
The vulnerability he neglects to include is human failure.  
 First, human misuse is a major concern: this ranges from weak passwords, poor 
security practices, and naive online practices, to keystroke logging, susceptibility to 
phishing and other social engineering. Federal employees bring work laptops home but 






data is stolen from a federal employee‟s car. In Afghanistan, security specialists had to 
sweep up all the USB keys floating in the marketplace, as many contained sensitive 
information, and were swiped from military computers and barracks. Even when 
government directives order USB keys be banned, the ports are left activated. The 
authors of STUXNET are believed to have gotten intimate details of the Iranian nuclear 
control systems by accessing the laptop of an Iranian official while travelling overseas.  
 People reuse the same passwords at work and online. Further, these passwords 
are routinely very weak: a recent leak of Hotmail passwords revealed that the following 
passwords were used most frequently: “password,” “123456,” and “qwerty.” Social 
networking has also opened an entirely new class of online threats that exploit human 
failures rather than technological ones (Dhanjani et al, 2009; McAfee 2010). If Clarke 
wished to make the claim that the U.S. is most vulnerable to cyber attack, he should 
have mentioned the penetration of social networking: Facebook traffic has overtaken 
Google traffic in North America. 
 Second, and perhaps more importantly, states and other determined adversaries 
have methods available to them to shortcut various security measures; skipping over 
technical obstacles using well placed intelligence operatives or exploiting social 
engineering as stated above. Clarke makes certain to argue that states and their 
intelligence agencies are actively engaging in this type of activity but doesn‟t emphasize 
enough the fact that these operate in concert with the technological angle. Recall the 
definition of cyber war: “when the term „cyber war‟ is used in this book, it refers to actions 
by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes 







 While Clarke argues that that a hacker can attack from anywhere in the world, 
the biggest threat still remain the inside man and social engineering. Examples of this 
include the recent leak of classified documents, taken from the top secret JWICS 
computer network by Private Bradley Manning. He burned gigabytes of classified data 
while pretending to listen to Lady Gaga (the jewel case in fact contained the blank DVD 
media onto which he burned the data). The U.S. secret network was also brought down 
in a similar way: an authorized individual stuck an infected USB drive into a military 
computer, specifically a laptop, and the end result was that the classified SIPRNet was 
breached (Nakashima 2010). 
 STUXNET is a prime example of this. It is believed that the Iranian nuclear power 
network was fairly well insulated from the Internet (despite Clarke‟s assertion that 
SCADA systems are notoriously unsecured and routinely have their radios 
misconfigured as on [p98-99]). Security professionals conclude that the worm was likely 
introduced thought a USB key via intelligence operatives or their contacts. Further, 
STUXNET highlights the fact that a determined state intelligence agency was interested 
and capable of conducting such an attack, especially given the quality of the worm, to 
include multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, and stolen security certificates to run system-
level drivers (Falliere 2010). 
 Inside knowledge of the target system is also clearly apparent in STUXNET: the 
worm instructed the control numbers, those corresponding to the target centrifuges, to 
spin up above their breaking point, and the closing command slowed them back down to 
almost exactly their normal operating frequencies (Clayton 2010).  
 Perhaps it is in this way that the U.S. is most vulnerable. Traditionally the U.S. 






lagged in the area of HUMINT, or human intelligence. Although Clarke gives an accurate 
breakdown of the technical vulnerability of a wired nation, he doesn‟t give enough credit 
to the human factor in exploiting that vulnerability. The greater distance between a cyber 
warrior and his target, the more sophisticated he must be to overcome the various layers 
separating him from that target. Having only a little social engineering or having an 









Solutions that Make No Sense 
 
 Taking Clarke‟s solutions seriously, we find them disappointing given the 
technical threat he identifies, or otherwise they are intrinsically underwhelming or 
obvious. What he lists: scanning the Internet backbone (top tier ISPs) for malware 
signatures, securing the military networks further, and isolating the power grid, are not 
bad solutions, however they essentially add little to what is already being done. At worst, 
they contradict statements Clarke makes earlier in the book. They really aren't solutions 
at all when looked at closely.  
 What is likely the most controversial solution, scanning the Internet for malware 
signatures, is also the most interesting. Clarke‟s critics consider this the most troubling of 
his suggestions from a civil liberties point of view, pointing to current bandwidth throttling 
as a precursor to broad content filtering if scanning is done (Singel 2010). Further, they 
point to the fact that ISPs already attempt to filter malware on their networks. However, 
when one also includes the difficulties encountered with regard to the IPv4 to IPv6 
transition, adding a thorough packet scanning requirement to the top level ISPs might be 
overwhelming. On the other hand, Canada appears ready to embrace this approach 
(Geist 2010).  
 Again, what this misses is the danger of the inside man and social engineering, 
which provide alternative vectors of attack and bypass using malware to gain privileged 






mentioned above. Social engineering can get a keystroke logger installed on an office 
machine, though which a hacker can obtain authentic credentials (Dhanjani et al, 2009).  
 The second solution is, by contrast, overwhelmingly obvious. Further securing 
the military networks is what he proposes: this is a prescription that no one could 
possibly disagree with. He provides specific direction regarding low-cost ways to 
improve the defense network: firewalls, anti-virus, multiple forms of user authentication, 
segment the networks, encrypt machines, and monitor traffic (p.174). If we accept these 
as novel recommendations, we‟d have to conclude that the U.S. military networks 
consist of the least secured computers on the planet.  
 Third, specifically isolate the power grid SCADA, appears to contradict the 
arguments he had made earlier. His earlier point is that it was essentially impossible to 
completely isolate a large-scale network. Further, any supposedly isolated SCADA 
machines were improperly configured 20% of the time (that is, have open connections to 
the Internet, or otherwise have their wireless radios on), and up to half inadvertently had 
direct connections to the Internet. Thus this solution is essentially saying 1) his earlier 
point about network penetration vulnerability can be overcome, and 2) that the network 
security staff should do their jobs better. So again, we are presented with a non-solution: 
we need to secure our vulnerabilities.  
 Clarke goes on to include better regulation (Chapters Four and Eight) as a 
necessary steps in achieving the three solutions presented above. He cites “smart 
regulations” several times as a path to achieving cyber security. Again, we have to ask 
who disagrees with this vague notion of improved regulation (other examples of his long-






  What Clarke really means in this regard, and he waits to say this at the very end 
of the book (p.276-279), is that the U.S., very specifically its Executive, lacks the political 
will to make the necessary demands on private industry: the electric companies and top 
level ISPs. While the federal government already has the power and regulatory authority 
to govern the private carriers (p.146), and impose fines on the power utilities (p.100-
101), it has not (as evidenced on an entire chapter dedicated to Presidents unwilling to 












 In closing, the book Cyber War does highlight genuine vulnerabilities: some 
existing since the creation of the Internet, and others brought about by middleware and 
other software designed to leverage the Internet‟s capabilities. Yet this image of a 
hacker unit bringing down vital systems continents away, comfortably, anonymously, 
solely through a computer terminal, is inconsistent with what has been deemed the first 
successful cyber attack in history: STUXNET. 
 While Trojans, backdoors and time-bombs have been variously used in early 
attempts to sabotage real vital systems, the success of STUXNET contrasts sharply, 
with its physical delivery via USB key and clear indications of intimate awareness of the 
target system. A lot of details of the target systems, systems presumably isolated from 
the Internet, were previously known to the cyber attacker, including the specific control 
numbers associated with the centrifuges, and the operating range values of those 
centrifuges. Genuine intelligence collection and operations were part of the STUXNET 
attack, in addition to the vulnerabilities in the Windows system and the SCADA, the 
Siemens industrial control software. Real leg-work was involved in this effort: it was not 
done from afar, and it was neither easy nor sterile. 
 In the following months after the publication of Cyber War, the U.S. response has 
been two-fold. First, the phrase “separate secure computer network” specifically for 






also helps to secure it (Shanker 2010). While this follows Clarke‟s assertions that a 
system on the Internet is essentially open to attack from anywhere on the globe, one 
wonders about the wisdom of creating a special insulated network composed entirely of 
systems absolutely vital to U.S. security. Such a network would invariably include more 
nodes than the SIPRNet or JWICS, if it were to include public sector “banking, aviation, 
and public utility systems” (Shanker 2010). The question would be whether 
USCYBERCOM could secure this larger civilian network any better than DoD‟s own 
classified networks. One must also consider the lesson of STUXNET: that intelligence 
operations, social engineering and the inside man, can get around isolation. More 
important, is the question regarding whether the NSA/USCYBERCOM commander is 
any more capable of exercising authority over telecommunications and electric utilities, 
and whether the President has to political will to back him. 
 Cyber-deterrence has been the second theme of U.S. cyber war preparations 
(Ignatius 2010, McConnell 2010). The Air Force specifically has lobbied for greater 
leeway in preparing such capabilities. And in the context of STUXNET, this does seem 
to make some sense. Remember that Iran had vowed a global retaliatory response to 
any strikes on its nuclear facilities. And yet after STUXNET‟s crippling attack (DEBKAfile 
2010), nothing has happened. Apparently, the slow but sweeping infection of its SCADA 
didn‟t translate into the escalated response Iran had committed to earlier. A cyber attack 
might be an appropriate response in such instances, especially if one assumes 
unwillingness in the Executive office to escalate. This part of the story is still unfolding, 









Appendix I: The Political Context 
 
 Richard Clarke didn‟t write his book in a vacuum, but did so in a specific context. 
In early 2010, the U.S. hadn‟t fully committed to a strategy for dealing with cyber war: in 
fact, there were many voices in opposition, convinced that the money would be better 
spent elsewhere.  
 Meanwhile, Russia and China appeared determined to develop and exploit 
cyber-attack capabilities: Russian usage had been typically tracked to private 
organizations primarily, including the mafia, although links to Russian intelligence have 
been made. Chinese usage was believed to have state military elements, with a 
dedicated cyber-corps (Libicki 2009). Both had repeatedly exercised cyber-warfare on 
nearby countries, including Estonia, Georgia, Kirgizstan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Both 
had also performed cyber attacks on the United States, particularly on defense systems 
and on defense companies. Lastly, France and Israel were also known to have actively 
pursued cyber-attack abilities (McAfee 2009). 
 The U.S. response could have been described as schizophrenic, occurring in fits 
and starts, before retreating to inaction. The mission has passed from one military 
command to another (White House 2009), and the military debated how useful it would 
be to assign resources to this, as compared to further investment to solidify positions of 
superiority, such as the dominance in areas where the US already has control: the 






 Given the uncertainty behind the qualitative threat of cyber warfare, the state was 
left to generate conclusions with minimal evidence, relying on widely diverging opinions 
from think tanks, relevant government agencies, and industry (Yoran 2010). This was a 
concern especially since there were likely to be billions of dollars at stake for cyber-
security spending. 
 As an example, House Resolution 4061: Cybersecurity Enhancement Act was 
long stalled in Senate (as of Cyber War’s publication), despite bipartisan sponsorship 
from Republican Olympia Snowe and Democrat John Rockefeller (Fulton 2010), along 
with other essentially domestic House Resolutions: H.R. 12: Paycheck Fairness Act, 
H.R. 2847: Jobs for Main Street Act, and H.R. 4194: Law Student Clinic Participation Act 
(The Hill 2010). Contrast the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, with H.R. 730: Nuclear 
Forensics and Attribution Act and H.R. 2194: Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 
2009, each had been passed by both the House and Senate.  
 This impasse in Congress had its effects and had not gone unnoticed. On the 
civilian side, including the White House and the Department of Homeland Security, 
Melissa Hathaway, the Cybersecurity Czar who began work under President George W. 
Bush and had completed the Cyberspace Policy Review (White House 2009) under 
President Barack Obama, reportedly departed her post after being frustrated that the 
position had no powers, and that none of the recommendations made had been acted 
upon (Gorman 2009). Other high profile departures during this period included Rod 
Beckstrom and Amit Yoran, under frustrations over bureaucratic wrangling and 
government turf issues resulting from a failure to define organizational responsibilities.  
 The lack of responsiveness from Congress had also been a concern for the 






The nominee for the proposed double-hatted NSA/USCYBERCOM 4-star General 
position, then Lt. General Keith Alexander, wrote a 32 page response to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee detailing the areas where legal restrictions were out of step 
with the evolving cyber threat (Shanker 2010). Again, as of Cyber War‟s publication, 
USCYBERCOM had yet to fully stand up, and Lt. General Alexander remained a 3-star 
general. 
  Also, the various branches of the armed services were jockeying for lead roles in 
cyber warfare, as extensions of their existing missions in information warfare. Causes 
ranged from funding predominance for the Army and Marines in the present wars, to role 
expansion-seeking of the younger Air Force, to the usual money chase exhibited by any 
federal organization. This was unsurprising given the vacuum of legal guidance on which 
agency should play a lead role in handling the emerging threat. At the same time, the 
question of why the military should even be involved had been raised, considering the 
reality that the military capabilities were very limited in handling or responding to cyber 
threats, being practically limited to high-powered RF injections (Fulghum 2010). 
 Then there was the National Security Agency, which at first downplayed its role 
in cyber warfare (Zetter 2009); something it did rather than simply remaining silent on 
the issue, which seems completely baffling. Yet its obvious positioning to handle the task 
led Rod Beckstrom to resign as the Department of Homeland Security's Director of the 
National Cybersecurity Center, citing his disagreement with that agency's participation. 
In the end, the obvious solution that could be implemented, a sub-unified command 
under USSTRATCOM headed by the NSA director would be selected. 
 However, even with clear guidance available on which agencies will be tackling 






another. In early 2010, the Department of Defense dismantled a CIA anti-terror website 
in Saudi Arabia via cyber attack, citing that it also functioned as a terrorist networking 
site. This infuriated the CIA and embarrassed the agency in front of several Saudi 
princes with whom it was collaborating (Nakashima 2010). It was clear that the 
bureaucracy needed coordination and specific direction regarding the division of labor. 
As stated above, the consolidation of cyber warfare under USCYBERCOM had yet to be 
fulfilled (and the memory of where to even locate such a force is likely still fresh in the 
minds of certain legislators). And the then-imminent anointing of the 









Appendix II: Timeline 
 
 To provide a common knowledge base from which to argue, a brief and selected 
history of relevant events follows. It is by no means comprehensive or exhaustive, but a 
little information might provide insight into the precise nature of the threat (adapted from 
multiple sources, mainly Libicki 2009; McAfee 2009; White House 2009). This is a broad 
brush overview; specifics will be discussed in the relevant sections. Note the increasing 
complexity and politicization of attacks over time. Also note how there is a clear 
development of cyber attacks towards what is observed today.  
(D)ARPA (1958): In response to the USSR's launch of Sputnik, the (Defense) 
Advanced Research Projects Agency is formed to ensure American technological parity 
at minimum, with an objective of technological dominance. 
ARPANET (1969): First nodes of packet-based precursor to modern day Internet 
are connected in California. The first international connection made in 1978, eventually 
consolidating on TCP/IPv4 packet specification (1980s).  
PERSONAL COMPUTING (1970s): Development of the modem, and "micro" 
computers designed for home use, as opposed to server-terminal architecture. 
Concurrently, initial forays into device-hacking begin, including the famous 2600 Hz 






MITNICK, KEVIN (1980s): Once the most wanted hacker in America, alleged to 
have gained remote PC access to NORAD servers. Known to have cloned cellular 
phone numbers and stolen private enterprise software.  
WORLD WIDE WEB (1990s): Interface adopted, followed by a period of 
explosive growth of the internet as most private nets connect into the vast decentralized 
network. ICANN manages the IP address assignment and Domain Name System, while 
IETF handles the technical specification of communication standards and protocols, 
such as IPv4 and IPv6. WWWC advances the HTML specification. 
VBSCRIPT (1990s): As Microsoft Windows, Internet Explorer and Outlook 
dominate home computing, Visual Basic Scripts are frequently used to create viruses 
transmitted via email, often merely being variations of one another. (To help the 
consumer, Microsoft automated running such scripts whenever one is received.) This 
culminates in the MELISSA virus and the ILOVEYOU virus, both known to have slowed 
internet traffic. 
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (1999): Bombing of Serbian forces in Kosovo, the 
U.S. is alleged to have broken into Serbian air warning systems to confuse Serbian air 
defenses, and thus permit U.S. air forces greater freedom of action over Kosovo. 
Meanwhile Serbian attempts to affect American systems are ineffective.  
MOONLIGHT MAZE (1999): Alleged but not confirmed attacks on U.S. 
Department of Defense systems and related defense-related corporations. Believed to 
have originated from Russia. 
NIMDA (2001): Internet worm notable for its multiple infection vectors. Known to 






SQL SLAMMER (2003): Worm exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in 
Microsoft's implementation of the SQL server. Known to have slowed internet traffic 
down.  
 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (2003): U.S. considers but ultimately declines to 
perform a cyber attack on Iraqi banking and economic institutions in the run-up to 
invasion. 
TITAN RAIN (2003): Espionage attacks on U.S. Department of Defense systems 
and related defense-oriented corporations. Believed to have originated from China.  
ESTONIA (2007): After moving a Soviet War Memorial out of the town center, 
this small republic endures an attack on its government and private networks, allegedly 
originating from Russia. Vital services in this highly net-oriented economy are disrupted. 
ZEUS BOTNET (2007): Trojan with keystroke logger designed to steal banking 
information, remains active with new versions, having infection rates still in the millions.  
GEORGIA (2008): During the South Ossetia war, Georgian computer systems 
are compromised. Government websites are defaced, and internet services are 
disrupted. Believed to have originated from Russia. 
CONFICKER (2008): Windows worm, still affecting thousands of machines 
comprising a massive BotNet. Notable for its advanced methods of obfuscation, and 
being able to be updated post-initial infection, still in the millions. Believed to have 
originated from Ukraine. 
KIRGHIZSTAN (2009): Major distributed denial of services (DDoS) attack, 
allegedly originating from Russia, on this central Asian republic, disrupts the majority of 






U.S. POWER GRID (2009): U.S. intelligence agencies identify an attack on the 
U.S. power grid and other civil infrastructure networks, designed to remotely disrupt 
services at some point in the future. The attacks are alleged to have come from Russia 
and China. 
GHOSTNET (2009): Chinese operation relying on a Trojan virus to gain control 
of Windows based machines, targeting computers systems of countries and 
organizations hosting or supporting the Dalai Lama. 
JULY BOTNET ATTACKS (2009): Latent BotNet, or group of compromised 
computers, used to perform DDoS attacks on commerce sites in the U.S. and South 
Korea. North Korea was believed to be involved, although likely had outside help.  
OPERATION AURORA (2010): Google revealed that attacks occurred on their 
information systems and on the systems of other major U.S. corporations (including 
defense oriented ones). The sophisticated attack on multiple U.S. companies was 
accomplished using obscure vulnerabilities, conducted using intermediary servers in the 
U.S. and Taiwan. China is believed to be the origin. 
USCYBERCOM (2010): Centralized military hub awaits complete stand-up. 
Military mission has passed from provisional organization to provisional organization for 
over a decade. From JTF-CND, to SPACECOM, to USCYBERCOM, to USCYBERCOM 
under STRATCOM.  
STUXNET (2010): See Conclusion above. 
 A casual reading of this list of events should point to a clear progression. On one 
hand, the sophistication of the attacks has grown, from the old VBScripts, phishing, and 
social engineering, to massive and update-capable botnets, concealed attack methods, 






engineering). On the other hand, the attacks have grown increasingly politicized, either 
in concert or as a prelude to both civil and military intervention, as envisioned by Qiao 
and Wang (1999).  
 And these trends are likely to continue. With each generation of software 
development, backwards compatibility hooks and libraries must be continually added, 
resulting in a multi-layered mess; in every machine, software still sits atop heaps of 
unmaintainable legacy code, even in clean new installs. And as seen in the history, 
norms of behavior have developed such that it has become commonplace for states to 
employ programmers to exploit these weaknesses for political purposes.  
 Yet why were these patterns missed, and why do many doubts remain both in 
private and public positions? Consider the 9/11 Commission Report's explanation on 
why the continental United States was attacked in 2001 without being cognizant of the 
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